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How FIFA Used the Principle of Autonomy 
of Sport to Shield Corruption in the Sepp 
Blatter Era 
PROFESSOR J. GORDON HYLTON†
INTRODUCTION 
The “corruption crisis” that rocked the world of international 
soccer in 2015 raised numerous questions about the motives of the high 
ranking officials who have run the Federation Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA) over the past three decades.1  This has 
© 2017 Professor J. Gordon Hylton. 
† Professor of Law and History, University of Virginia. Hylton is a graduate of Oberlin College 
and the University of Virginia Law School. He also holds a Ph.D. in the history of American 
civilization from Harvard University. 
1 The FIFA Investigation Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/sports/soccer/fifa-investigation.html?ribbon-ad-
idx=5&rref=sports/soccer&module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Soccer&action=swipe
&region=FixedRight&pgtype=article&_r=0; FIFA Corruption Crisis: Key Questions 
Answered, BBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066. 
FIFA is the international governing body for the sport of soccer/football - consistent with the 
practice in the United States, this essay refers to the sport as “soccer,” rather than as “football,” 
as the sport is known in most of the world.  FIFA sponsors the World Cup, the world’s most 
popular sporting event, and oversees the activities of six regional confederations which 
together include 211 national organizations, usually referred to as “associations” or 
“federations.” FIFA’s mission, according to its webpage, is to “develop football everywhere 
and for all, to touch the world through its inspiring tournaments and to build a better future 
through the power of the game.” About FIFA, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).   
The ultimate policy making agency within FIFA is the Congress, which meets once or twice 
each year and is composed of one representative from each member association.  Between 
sessions of the Congress, the primary decision-making body is the Council (previously known 
as the Executive Committee).  It consists of the President, eight Vice-Presidents, twenty-four 
regular members, and the Secretary General.  It also meets twice each year. Matters that must 
be resolved when neither the Congress nor the Council are in session, are handled by the 
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been especially true in regard to long-time FIFA leader Joseph “Sepp” 
Blatter, who served as Secretary-General of the organization from 
1981 to 1998 and as President from June of 1998 until October 2015, 
when he was removed from office.2  Both Blatter and his predecessor 
as president, Brazilian Joao Havelange, have now been implicated in 
significant acts of corruption, as had been widely rumored for many 
years. 3 One of the signature policies of FIFA during the Blatter era 
was the aggressive enforcement of what is usually referred to as the 
“non-intervention” or “non-interference” policy. Under this policy, the 
national associations that make up FIFA are required to operate 
without any “third-party” interference, including governmental 
regulation of their decisions.4 This article examines FIFA’s use of the 
non-intervention policy during the Blatter era, arguing that in many 
Bureau of the Council (previously known as the Emergency Committee) which is composed 
of the president and one representative from each of the six regional confederations.  The day-
to-day operations of FIFA are handled by the President and the Secretary General.  See Who 
We Are, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/index.html (last visited Apr. 
6, 2017).  
2 For basic biographical facts for Blatter see Profile: Sepp Blatter, THE SCOTSMAN (Nov. 20, 
2011), http://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/profile-sepp-blatter-1-1975599.  For the 
events surrounding his removal as president of FIFA, see Sam Borden, FIFA President Sepp 
Blatter and Other Top Officials Suspended, Deepening FIFA’s Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/sports/soccer/sepp-blatter-michel-platini-
jerome-valcke-fifa-suspended.html?_r=0 and The Rise and Fall of Sepp Blatter, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/05/27/sports/soccer/sepp-blatter-
fifa-timeline.html?_r=0.  
Blatter was banned from any form of participation in FIFA for eight years, but a FIFA appeals 
board reduced the penalty to six years. Rachel Axon, Sepp Blatter Loses Appeal of Six Year 
FIFA Ban, USA TODAY (Dec. 5, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/soccer/2016/12/05/sepp-blatter-fifa-ban-
cas/94989062/.  Blatter’s effort to have his ouster over turned by the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport was unsuccessful. Sepp Blatter: Former FIFA President's Six-Year Ban Upheld after 
Appeal to CAS, BBC SPORT (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/38205918. 
3 Havelange served as president of FIFA from 1974 to 1998 and as Honorary FIFA President 
until 2013 when he was forced to resign (at age 97) after the FIFA Ethics Committee 
determined that he had taken bribes on numerous occasions as FIFA President.  Two years 
earlier, he had resigned his position on the International Olympic Committee because of a 
similar ethics investigation.  He died in August 2016, at age 100. Joao Havelange Obituary, 
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/aug/16/joao-
havelange-obituary.  For Blatter and rumors of his links to corruption, see supra text 
accompanying note 2. 
4 The six regional confederations are AFC (Asia), CAF (Africa), CONCACAF (North 
America and Caribbean), CONMEBOL (South America), OFC (Oceania) and UEFA 
(Europe). FIFA: Who We Are, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-
are/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). Most national federations represent individual 
countries, although a few, like the Faroes Islands, come from areas that are not fully 
independent. For historical reasons, England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland each have 
a separate association. 
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instances the principle was used to protect FIFA rather than improve 
public enjoyment of sport. 
I. FIFA’S NON-INTERVENTION PRINCIPLE
From the early 1990’s onward, FIFA promptly responded to third-
party, governmental interventions by suspending or threatening to 
suspend the affected national federation until the interference stopped 
and any changes brought about by it were reversed.5  Because 
suspension meant that the affected federation could not participate in 
any international soccer matches, including the popular FIFA World 
Cup and the Confederation Cups, few governments have had the will 
to stand up to FIFA and risk the political consequences of 
disappointing the soccer fans among their constituents.6  On top of that, 
a suspended team also lost the opportunity to share in FIFA revenues 
which are not insubstantial and have been liberally distributed.7 Over 
the past three decades, the popularity of international soccer has 
skyrocketed, and as a result FIFA’s coffers have been filled to the brim 
with income from live matches, broadcasting contracts, and licensing 
deals.8  According to FIFA, over 70% of its annual revenues, which 
exceeded $2.1 billion in 2014, are redistributed to the federations 
through direct grants and development programs.9 For many smaller 
federations, these FIFA transfers constitute a large portion of their 
annual revenues. 10    
5 For an example of such an action, see Letter from Fatma Samoura, Secretary General, FIFA, 




6 FIFA, FIFA STATUTES art. 16 (Apr. 2016), 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/78/29/07/fifastatutsweben_n
eutral.pdf, 14–15. 
7 Peter Berlin, The FIFA Story: Money, Corruption, and Soccer, (Apr. 27, 2016, 11:11 AM), 
WORLD POLICY BLOG, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2016/04/27/fifa-story-money-
corruption-and-soccer. 
8 FIFA, FINANCIAL AND GOVERNANCE REPORT 2015 (May 13, 2016), 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/77/08/71/gb15_fifa_
web_en_neutral.pdf at 16. 
9Id.; FIFA Expenditure, FIFA.COM,
http://www.fifa.com/governance/finances/expenditure.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). 
10 Governance: Finances, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/governance/finances/ (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2017).  For FIFA’s revenues in 2014 and earlier, see Isabelle Frazier, FIFA’s Finances 
– Where Does All the Money Come From?, THE TELEGRAPH (May 29, 2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/fifa/11635985/Fifas-finances-where-does-all-the-
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Given this, suspension from FIFA could have catastrophic 
consequences for both the national soccer federation and its country’s 
government.  Not surprisingly, the public corruption prosecutions 
since 2015 have revealed a persistent pattern. FIFA officials from all 
levels of the organization are accused of siphoning funds distributed to 
the national federations and the confederations, but when national 
governments investigating their federations face the prospect of 
suspension, the investigation abruptly ends.11  What is just now coming 
to light, moreover, is the existence of a set of arrangements in which 
Blatter and others in the FIFA leadership maintained their power by 
both awarding financial grants to national federations, especially those 
located in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, and, by overlooking 
incidents of mismanagement and corruption.12  In exchange, the 
federations who benefitted from this largesse supported Haverlange 
and then Blatter in the FIFA Congress and on FIFA committees.13 To 
prevent public exposure of this system, the FIFA leadership protected 
its supporters by threatening to suspend their federations any time 
governmental agents or legislatures got too close to their daily 
operations.14Thus, the non-intervention principle became linked to the 
protection of a network of corruption inside FIFA itself.15   
The effect of this system did not go unnoticed.  Although he does 
not explore the question of FIFA’s motivation, in his study of the 
development of African soccer in the late twentieth century, 
money-come-from.html. 
11 See FIFA Corruption Crisis: A Complete List of High-Ranked Officials Who were Banned, 
Fined or Suspended, REUTERS NEWS SERV. (Feb. 25, 2016), 
https://www.sportskeeda.com/football/fifa-corruption-crisis-complete-list-all-banned-fined-
suspended-officials.e 
12 For an example of such a grant in the Caribbean see Alex Duff, FIFA Grants Seen Wasted 
as Blatter Roadshow Arrives in Caribbean, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 21, 2013, 6:12 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-21/fifa-grants-seen-wasted-as-blatter-
roadshow-arrives-in-caribbean. 
13 Andy Dabilis, Blatter’s FIFA: Growth, Scandals, THE NAT’L HERALD (June 3, 2015) 
https://www.thenationalherald.com/87124/blatters-fifa-growth-scandals/. 
14 Brian Oliver, Free-for-all and corruption in African football shames Fifa, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 24, 2010, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2010/oct/24/corruption-
african-football-fifa. 
15  For an attempt to specifically delineate how this network operated in the final years of 
Blatter’s presidency, see Sepp Blatter: How the Machiavellian Master of FIFA Power Politics 
Fell, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/dec/21/sepp-blatter-fifa-power-politics. For 
evidence of its success in buttressing the power within FIFA of Blatter and his predecessor, 
see TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: SPORT 157–68 (2016). 
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Zimbabwean sociologist Manase Kudzai Chiweshe has concluded that 
“FIFA’s standing statutes of non-interference have often meant corrupt 
leaders [of African sporting organizations] continuing in their 
positions for decades,” and that “the major obstacles facing all 
countries from combating corruption in football are FIFA’s statutes of 
non-interference.”16  Moreover, while there are legitimate arguments 
that the sports industry and the public both benefit from the absence of 
direct governmental involvement is sport, belief in such a principle 
does not really explain the pattern of action by FIFA in the Blatter era.  
If FIFA had been truly committed to a principal of national association 
autonomy, then it would have attempted to eliminate government 
involvement wherever it occurred.  However, during Blatter’s years as 
president, FIFA voiced no objections to the clearly high level of state 
involvement with the national soccer programs in Russia and China 
and in the still communist countries like North Korea and Cuba.17  
Tellingly, the vast majority of countries that have been threatened with 
sanctions for violations of the “non-intervention” principal since the 
early 1990’s have been located in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and 
Eastern Europe, where economic resources are less abundant, but also 
where the sports/soccer systems are not completely under state control 
as they are in North Korea and Cuba.18 Developing nations present 
more opportunities for government involvement in sport (as well as 
more opportunities for corruption), but they are also much more 
susceptible to intimidation by FIFA.19  There is no question that Blatter 
 
16 Manase Kudzai Chiweshe, The Problem with African Football: Corruption and the 
(Under)development of the Game on the Continent, AFR. SPORTS L. & BUS. BULL. 27–33 (Feb. 
2014) http://www.africansportslawjournal.com/Bulletin_2_2014_Kudzai.pdf.  
17 For the involvement of the government in sport in China, see MING LI, ERIC MACINTOSH, & 
GONZALO BRAVO, INTERNATIONAL SPORT MANAGEMENT, 199–218 (2011); for Russia, 
see OLGA RYMKEVICH, SPORTS LAW IN RUSSIA (2016); for the Democratic Republic of Korea, 
see Udo Merkel, The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea, in SPORT AND 
NATIONALISM IN ASIA: POWER, POLITICS AND IDENTITY 104–118 (Fan Hong & Lu Zhouxiang, 
eds., 2015); for Cuba, see Jere Longman, Under Fidel Castro, Sports Symbolized Cuba’s 
Strength and Vulnerability, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/sports/under-fidel-castro-sport-symbolized-cubas-
strength-and-vulnerability.html.  In regards to FIFA’s hands-off policy toward Russia, it did 
not hurt that Russian President/Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was one of Blatter’s most vocal 
supporters. Near the end of Blatter’s career Putin publicly proclaimed that Blatter’s work with 
FIFA was worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize. Jethro Mullen, Sepp Blatter Deserves Nobel Prize 
for FIFA Work, Russia's Vladimir Putin Says, CNN (July 28, 2015), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/28/football/vladimir-putin-sepp-blatter-fifa-nobel-prize/.  
18 Matthew Kenyon, Why Africa Backs Sepp Blatter, BBC NEWS (May 29, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32928984. 
19 See id. 
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and his predecessor exploited this situation to maintain their positions 
of power within FIFA.20 
Although FIFA had regularly suspended member associations for 
being subject to outside interference for the previous quarter century, 
it is somewhat surprising that until 2009, the FIFA Statutes only 
indirectly referred to the duty of federations to avoid third-party 
interference.21  As late as 2008, references in the FIFA Statutes 
consisted only of requirements that the election or appointment of 
office-holders be conducted under rules that guarantee “the complete 
independence of the election or appointment,” and that they had an 
obligation to make decisions independently of any external entity.22 
However, in 2009, the FIFA Statutes were revised to make the nature 
of this offense much more explicit.23  For example, new Articles 13 
and 17, combined with the enforcement implications of Article 14, 
clearly identified the prohibition and authorized FIFA to respond 
aggressively.24 Article 13.1 listed the obligations of membership which 
include the obligation “to manage their affairs independently and 
ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third-parties,”25 
while Article 13.3 authorized sanctions “even if the third-party 
influence was not the fault of the Member concerned.”26  Article 17.1 
reiterated the same principle: “Each member shall manage its affairs 
independently and with no influence from third-parties,” and the 
remaining sections of the article elaborate on that point.27  Although 
 
20  See id. 
21 See FIFA, supra note 6, at art. 17.1. 
22 See e.g., FIFA Standard Statutes (2004), Art. 10.3(g); FIFA Statutes (2008), Art. 17.1. Also 
included was a clause that required member federations to adopt rules prohibiting athletes and 
officials from bringing lawsuits against FIFA, the federation, or member clubs in national 
courts unless such recourse was specifically permitted by FIFA Statutes. Id. at art. 64.2. 
23 See FIFA, FIFA STATUTES (2009) 
https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/01/24/fifastatuten2009_e.pdf. 
24 Id. 
25  Id. at art. 13.1(g). 
26 Id. at art. 13.3. 
27 Id. at Article 17. In its entirety, Article 17 provided: 
Independence of Members and their Bodies. 
1. Each Member shall manage its affairs independently and with no influence from third 
parties. 
2. A Member’s bodies shall be either elected or appointed in that Association. A Member’s 
statutes shall provide for a procedure that guarantees the complete independence of the 
election or appointment. 
3. Any Member’s bodies that have not been elected or appointed in compliance with the 
provisions of par. 2, even on an interim basis, shall not be recognized by FIFA. 
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no Article specifically equates “third-parties” with national 
governments, FIFA has long insisted that protection of its members 
from state influence was one of its primary purposes.28  Additionally, 
Article 14.1, while vesting the ultimate authority to expel or suspend 
in the FIFA Congress, authorized the Executive Committee to act 
immediately to correct a problem, subject only to later review by the 
Congress.29  Thus, not only did the FIFA leadership have the authority 
under its own rules to intervene in disputes between a federation and 
its government, it had the power to act quickly.30  Finally, Article 68.3, 
like its predecessor provisions, prohibited lawsuits in national courts.31  
Instead, challenges to federation or FIFA actions could be brought only 
to FIFA-approved arbitration panels or, in certain cases, to the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland.32   
The 2009 changes remained in force until 2016, when as part of 
the substantial revision of the FIFA Statutes following the 2015 
corruption scandal, a new Article 19 was adopted which scaled back 
the ability of FIFA to suspend federations because of governmental 
violations of the non-intervention policy.33 Under the new provision, 
third-party and governmental involvement in the affairs of the soccer 
federations are prohibited only when the influence or involvement is 
undue.”34  New Article 14 (former Article 13) defining the obligations 
of members also specifically limits the requirement of independent 
action to the standard defined in Article 19.35 
II. HOW FIFA DISCOVERED THE VALUE OF THE NON-INTERVENTION 
PRINCIPLE IN THE BLATTER ERA 
Preserving their autonomy and avoiding direct regulation by state 
and national governments has always been a priority of private 
 
4. Decisions passed by bodies that have not been elected or appointed in compliance with par. 
2 shall not be recognized by FIFA. 
    Id. 
28 See infra note 52. 
29 FIFA, supra note 23.  
30 Id. Provisions for suspension and expulsion of members are contained in FIFA, FIFA 
STATUTES (2015), Articles 14 and 15.  Article 14.3 specific provides that suspended 
federations cannot enjoy any of the benefits of membership. Id.  
31 Id. at art. 68. 
32 Id. 
33 FIFA, FIFA STATUTES (2016), Article 19. 
34 Id. The statute does not, however, attempt to define the term “undue.” 
35 Id. at article 14. 
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sporting institutions, such as FIFA.  The self-contained sports leagues 
of North America (including the National Football League, the 
National Basketball Association, the National Hockey League, and the 
various major and minor league baseball leagues), the national sports 
federations around the world modeled on Britain’s Football 
Association, the international sports federations, and the International 
Olympic Committee have all sought to preserve their independence 
from state control and to a large extent from state regulation, although 
all are happy to receive state subsidies, especially in the form of new 
playing facilities.36  However, there is very little evidence that FIFA 
was particularly concerned with the issue of strict federation autonomy 
between the time of its founding in 1904 and the early 1990’s; so long 
as member federations complied with their obligations to the 
organization, little attention was paid to the question of state 
involvement in sport at the national level.37   
Moreover, given the presence of federations in its ranks from 
fascist, communist, and totalitarian states during much of its history, it 
is difficult to see how FIFA could have demanded a non-interference 
boundary between national governments and their soccer federations, 
even had it wanted to do so. 38  Only after the fall of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 did such an enforcement policy become even credible.39  In 
fact, in its early history, a more important concern had to do with FIFA 
improperly intervening in the operation of its member federations.40 
Such considerations appear to have retarded the early growth of FIFA, 
 
36 The private character of sports organization has been accepted as the norm in the United 
States that there is relatively little scholarly writing on the so-called “autonomy principle” in 
the United States.  For the North America situation generally, see Nathaniel Grow, Regulating 
Professional Sports Leagues, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 573 (2015).  The subject has received 
more attention in Europe.  See, e.g., Jean-Loup Chappelet, Autonomy of Sport in Europe 
(Council of Europe Publ’g 2010), and the sources cited therein. 
37 For the early history of FIFA, see ALAN TOMLINSON, FIFA (FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE 
DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION): THE MEN, THE MYTHS AND THE MONEY 12-70 (2014). 
38 The relationship between totalitarian states and sports is a much studied topic. See, for 
example, James Riordan, SPORT IN SOVIET SOCIETY (1977); James Riordan, The Impact of 
Communism on Sport, 32 HIST. SOC. RES. 110 (2007); SIMON MARTIN, FOOTBALL AND 
FASCISM: THE NATIONAL GAME UNDER MUSSOLINI (2004); DAVID CLAY LARGE, NAZI GAMES: 
OLYMPICS OF 1936 (2007); and for the nation state and sport in the 1930’s more generally, 
BARBARA J. KEYES, GLOBALIZING SPORT: NATIONAL RIVALRY AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY IN THE 1930’S (2006). 
39 Fall of the Soviet Union, HISTORYCHANNEL.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/cold-
war/fall-of-soviet-union. 
40 History of FIFA—Founding, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-
are/history/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). 
6_FINAL_HYLTON (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2017  2:14 PM 
142 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32:134 
 
which went from seven members in 1904 to just twenty members in 
1920.41  Concern over FIFA interference prompted the four British 
Football Associations to withdraw from the organization in 1920, and 
while they all rejoined in 1924, all withdrew again in 1928, and did not 
return to the ranks of FIFA until after the Second World War.42   
Even after the collapse of fascism in the 1970’s and European 
Communism in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s the issue of sports 
federation autonomy and freedom from government interference did 
not really arise within FIFA until the mid-1990’s.43  A study of the 
history of state involvement in world soccer published in 1996 
assumed what was historically undeniable—FIFA had always looked 
the other way in regard to extensive state involvement in the national 
football federations.44  Although The Times of London noted in 1987 
that FIFA itself was noticeably trying “to resist all outside political 
interferences by such organizations as the UN, the EEC, UNESCO and 
the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa,” the observation made no 
reference to FIFA trying to draw sharp lines between its national 
federations and their national governments.45   
Suspensions of entire federations, as opposed to individual 
players, were also quite rare before the 1990’s; only a handful of such 
suspensions were forthcoming between 1960 and 1990.46  For 
example, in 1960, the Australian Soccer Football Association was 
fined and suspended for violating FIFA player transfer rules which 
required a player’s new club to compensate his old one for his 
 
41 Peter J. Beck, British Football and FIFA, 1928-46: Going to War or Peaceful Coexistence?, 
18th Annual Conference, (Aug. 19, 1999), 
http://www.fifa.com/development/news/y=1999/m=8/news=british-society-sports-history-
71171.html; see also History of FIFA—Founding, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/who-we-are/history/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). 
42 Beck, supra note 41.  Then as now, Great Britain was treated as four countries for purposes 
of international soccer competition with associations in England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland. 
Today, both the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland have their own federations.  
43 JEAN-LOUP CHAPPELET, AUTONOMY OF SPORT IN EUROPE 7 (Apr. 2010), 
http://www.coe.int/t/DG4/EPAS/resources/6720-0-ID8704-
Autonomy%20of%20sport%20assemble.pdf. 
44 VIC DUKE & LIZ CROLLEY, FOOTBALL, NATIONALITY AND THE STATE (1996) (indicating that 
state involvement in the affairs of domestic football was close to the norm for world soccer as 
late as the 1970’s and early 1980’s). 
45 David Miller, Football: United States may be hosts for 1994, THE LONDON TIMES (Mar. 21, 
1987). 
46 See infra notes 48–54. 
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services.47  Three years later, FIFA suspended the Federations of 
Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic for non-payment of dues, but 
then reinstated them once the payments were forthcoming.48 Later in 
the decade, South Africa (1964) and Rhodesia (1970), were both 
suspended but only because of their white supremacist racial policies 
and not because of any other illegalities in the operation of their 
programs.49  More than a decade later in 1981, the United States-based 
North American Soccer League faced suspension because of 
unauthorized rule changes pertaining to off-sides penalties and in game 
substitutions, but rather than challenge the suspension it abandoned the 
rule changes.50  In 1986, the Uruguay Football Association was fined 
and threatened with suspension because of repeated acts of 
“unsportsmanlike behavior on the part of its national team, but it 
apparently dropped its controversial activities to avoid a punishment 
more severe than censure.”51  Two years later, in April 1988, the 
Mexican Federation of Association Football was suspended for two 
years for covertly allowing four over-age players to play on its FIFA 
youth championship team.52  A more serious episode occurred the 
following year when Chile was suspended from both the 1990 and 
1994 World Cup competitions because its goaltender faked a serious 
injury that required the stoppage of a World Cup qualifying match with 
Brazil in which Chile was losing, one to zero.53  None of these actions 
involved allegations of improper interference by third-parties, 
governmental or otherwise.54 
However, in 1992, FIFA began to take a more aggressive 
approach and one that involved policing the internal affairs of its 
 
47 Psst All Summer, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Dec. 15, 2013), 
http://www.smh.com.au/sport/pssst-all-summer-20131214-2ze3z.html, (citing ROY HAY & 
BILL MURRAY, A HISTORY OF FOOTBALL IN AUSTRALIA (2014). Rather than pay the fine, the 
ASFA folded, but a revived association was readmitted to FIFA in 1963, following the 
payment of the fine. Id. 
48 Soccer Leagues Lag in Dues, Suspended, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1963, at F1. 
49 Briefs: Soccer, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1992, at A3 (reinstatement of South Africa by FIFA); 
Football Congress Blasts Rhodesia, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER, June 25, 1979, at 38. 
50 FIFA Suspension Faced by NASL, THE TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 4, 1981; NASL Yields 
on 2 Rules, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1981, at C1. One of the traditional goals of FIFA was the 
standardization of playing rules across the world. 
51 Grahame L. Jones, Uruguayan Team, Fined, Censured, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1986, at C17. 
52 FIFA Lifts Mexican Punishment, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 4, 1989. At 
the request of other Latin American federations, the punishment was later reduced to one year. 
53 FIFA Bans Chile from World Cup for Rojas’s Deceit, THE TIMES, Dec. 9, 1989. 
54 See supra notes 48–53. 
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federations. In March of that year, it threatened to suspend the 
Brazilian Football Federation in a complicated case that directly 
involved the family of FIFA president Joao Heverlange.55  This matter 
did not involve issues of direct governmental attempts to influence the 
federation, but it did involve a soccer team going to court to sue the 
federation, which was specifically prohibited by FIFA rules.56 The 
previous July in 1991, Brazilian federation president Ricardo Teixiera, 
Haverlange’s son-in-law, had engineered his early re-election.57  
Believing that the election had not been proper, the Flamengo soccer 
club, the recently crowned champions of Campeonato Brasileriro Serie 
A (the top Brazilian league), challenged the legitimacy of Teixiera’s 
reelection in a Brazilian court.58 While the Brazilian federation took 
no immediate action, FIFA  banned Flamengo from future 
competitions.59  Flamengo, undeterred, filed suit against FIFA in a 
Swiss court. At that point, FIFA threatened to suspend the Brazilian 
federation if it did not take immediate steps to ban Flamengo.60  In 
response, the Brazilian federation did suspend Flemengo, which in turn 
withdrew both its lawsuits.61  In the end, Teixiera remained in power 
for years to come.62  If nothing else, the Brazilian episode 
demonstrated that FIFA could use the threat of suspension to force a 
non-cooperating federation, even one in a large, important country like 
Brazil, to realign its internal policies with international organization’s 
wishes.   
Somewhat ironically, later that year FIFA also suspended the 
Yugoslavian federation, not for acts of misconduct in the world of 
soccer, but because of alleged atrocities committed by Serbia during 
the Balkan War.63  Rather than FIFA complaining about governmental 
 
55 Jamie Rainbow, Ricardo Teixeira: how 25 years of absolute power came to an end, 
WORLDSOCCER (Jan 16, 2014), http://www.worldsoccer.com/columnists/keir-
radnedge/ricardo-teixeira-how-25-years-of-absolute-power-came-to-an-end-344414. 
56 Id. 
57 Flamengo banned from international football, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Oct. 30, 1991). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Hurtful Rifts Give Bucello a Daunting Job, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 20, 1992) 
(discussing the Brazilian situation). 
61 Id.  
62 Soccer, COURIER MAIL (Brisbane), Mar. 21, 1992 (discussing resolution of Brazilian 
situation). 
63 Patrick Strickland, Palestinian soccer players tell FIFA Israel violates their ‘basic rights’, 
AL JAZEERA AM. (May 20, 2015), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/5/20/palestinians-campaign-for-israels-
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threat’s to the autonomy of sport, a group of Yugoslav athletes and 
sports officials denounced the international soccer authority for 
invading the autonomy and independence of sport in Yugoslavia for 
what it felt were purely political reasons.64 However, it would be in 
nearby Greece that FIFA would first make direct use of the non-
intervention rules. In 1993, FIFA was approached by the Greek 
Football Federation (EPO) for assistance in its struggle with the Greek 
government.65  Although the federation and the government had 
traditionally cooperated on sporting matters, a series of match-fixing 
incidents in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s prompted the Greek 
Parliament to consider legislation that would have given the 
government a role in the selection of referees and an ability to make 
appointments to the sports disciplinary courts operated by the EPO that 
were supposedly dealing with the scandal.66  Such a transfer of power 
to the government was emphatically opposed by the Greek 
federation.67 
Not surprisingly, the EPO, many of whose leaders had been 
suspension-from-fifa.html. 
64 Yugoslav Athletes Plea to Drop Sports Sanctions, UNITED PRESS INT’L, June 3, 1992, 
available at the Lexis News database. 
65 The Greek-FIFA conflict of 1993 episode recounted in this and the following two 
paragraphs appears to have gone virtually unreported in the English language press. A search 
of the news sources in the Lexis News database, the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, 
the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times revealed no stories about this conflict. The 
facts recounted here and in the following paragraph are taken from the following secondary 
sources, which are based on Greek language primary sources: Henk Erik Meier & Borja 
Garcia, Protecting Private Transnational Authority against Public Intervention: FIFA’s 
Power Over National Governments, 93 PUB. ADMIN. 890 (2015); Borja Garcia & Henk Erik 
Meier, Keeping Private Governance Private: Is FIFA Blackmailing National Governments?, 
Paper presented at the 8th Sport and EU Annual Conference, Istanbul, Turkey, June 27-28, 
2010, http://www.sportandeu.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Keeping-private-
governance-private_submitted-for-sportandeuconference.pdf; Demitri Panagiotopoulos & 
Ioannis Mourniakis. Suspension of Governing Bodies: Analysis, 4 WORLD SPORT L. REP. 8,6 
(2006); Demitri Panagiotopoulos & Ioannis Mournianakis, Verbandsautonomie und staatliche 
Regulierung – Der Konflikt zwischen FIFA und Griechischem Fußballbund [Autonomy and 
state regulation - The conflict between the Greek Football Federation and FIFA], SPORT UND 
RECHT [SPORT & THE L.] 190–92 (2006). 
66 Ian Ross, Swansea Dismiss Manager, THE TIMES, Mar. 6, 1990 (reporting a number of 
different stories including one about the Greek match-fixing scandal). Ironically, the events 
that triggered the 1993 clash started in March 1990, when Greek referee Constantin 
Dimitriadis reported to FIFA Secretary-General Sepp Blatter that he had evidence of attempted 
bribery and match fixing at the highest levels of Greek football. 
67 For background see Christos Anagnostopoulos, The Battlefield of Greek Football: 
Organizing Top-Tier Football in Greece, in ORGANISATION AND GOVERNANCE OF TOP
FOOTBALL ACROSS EUROPE: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 209–23, especially 209–13 
(Hallgeir Gammelsaeter & Benoit Senaux, eds., 2011). 
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rumored to be involved in the alleged wrongdoing, opposed the 
proposed legislation. When it became clear that the legislation would 
likely pass, the EPO leaders contacted FIFA directly and requested that 
it “suspend” the EPO from future competitions in order to put pressure 
on the Greek government to abandon the proposed changes.68 As 
requested, FIFA threatened to suspend the EPO if the proposed statute 
went into effect, a decision which would have prevented Greece from 
participating in international matches, including the 1994 World 
Cup.69  Although Greece had traditionally been one of the doormats of 
European soccer, the Greek national team playing in the 1993 
preliminaries was quite strong, and by early May, it had qualified for 
the World Cup’s final round for the first time ever.70 A suspension 
would have dashed the hopes of Greek soccer fans, and fearing the 
possibility of a popular reprisal, the Greek government withdrew the 
proposed legislation.71 
Less successful was an effort later the same year in which FIFA 
attempted to reverse a decision of the Paraguayan government to 
cancel the final four weeks of its premier professional soccer league’s 
1993-94 season.  Citing endless corruption and violence at games, 
Paraguay announced in December that the remaining games of the 
Paraguayan Football League were being cancelled.72  It also instructed 
the directors of the league to elect a 1993 champion to represent the 
country in the following year’s Copa Libertadores, the annual Latina 
American professional championship.73 Terminating a league season 
early was contrary to FIFA guidelines, and the FIFA Executive 
Committee announced that it would protest the decision and would 
undertake an investigation of the matter.74  In this case, there is no 
68 In the future, embattled association officials, such as EPO, seeking support from FIFA 
would become a predictable feature of FIFA clashes with national governments.  
69 See Anagnostopoulos, supra note 67. 
70 See Phil Hersh, 3 European Doormats Rise Up for Finals, CHI. TRIB., May 8, 1993, at A6.   
71  For the withdrawal of the legislation, see supra note 67. The Greek team travelled to the 
United States for the 1994 World Cup, but there it was quickly eliminated by three consecutive 
losses to Argentina, Bulgaria, and Nigeria.  The Greek team went scoreless in all three games. 
See FIFA, 1994 FIFA World Cup USA, FIFA.COM, 
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/archive/usa1994/groups/index.html.   
72 Vote decides Paraguay Title, THE INDEP. (Dec. 31, 1993). 
73 The Copa Libertadores was a competition of independent professional teams. Bienvenidos 
a la Copa Libertadores 2017, COPALIBERTADORES.COM, http://www.copalibertadores.com/ 
(last visited May 14, 2017). 
74 Vote Decides Paraguay Title, supra note 72; Paraguay Elect Champions, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 
31, 1993; Ian Broadly, Ajax Back Their Loyal Fans, THE HERALD, Jan. 17, 1994 (discussing 
the FIFA investigation’s lack of impact). 
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evidence that FIFA’s intervention in any way altered the decision of 
the Paraguayan government.75  Of course, unlike the case in Greece 
earlier in the year, FIFA had not threatened to suspend the Paraguayan 
Football Federation, probably because of government’s intervention 
applied only to the internal operation of the country’s top professional 
league, and thus did not directly affect FIFA’s primary area of 
operation. In any event, by mid-January it was clear that the FIFA 
investigation was going to have little effect.76 
The following year, FIFA did apply the Greek approach in a 
situation involving African soccer power Cameroon.  On March 30, 
1994, shortly before the Cameroonian national team, known as the 
“Indomitable Lions,” left for the United States and the 2014 World 
Cup, the Cameroon Football Federation’s (FECAFOOT) central 
committee fired its president, Pascal Owona.77  Owona was accused by 
his colleagues of mismanagement, and the federation’s General 
Secretary Maha Daher was elevated to the presidential post.78  
However, Cameroonian Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu, 
apparently at the behest of President Paul Biva, vetoed the dismissal of 
Owona and ordered Minister of Sports Bernard Massou II to remove 
all members of the central committee responsible for Owona’s 
discharge.79  However, on April 3, before Massou could act, FIFA 
Secretary General Blatter informed FECAFOOT that it recognized 
Daher, not Owona, as the head of the Cameroonian organization.80  In 
addition, he stated that if the government of Cameroon persisted in its 
efforts on behalf of Owona, FIFA would have no choice but to suspend 
the Lions from all FIFA activities, including the 1994 World Cup.81 
Blatter also let it be known that FIFA was prepared to substitute the 
75 Vote decides Paraguay title, supra note 72. 
76 See generally, Ian Broadley, Ajax back their loyal fans, THE HERALD, Jan. 17, 1994, at 6. 
The Scottish journalist did not appear to take FIFA’s investigation very seriously, observing, 
“FIFA has launched an inquiry but that will solve little where football has now gone out of 
bounds once too often.” Id. 
77 Etienne Tasse, Cameroon-Sport/Politics: Scoring Government Goals With Football, INTER
PRESS SERV. (Mar. 15, 1995), http://www.ipsnews.net/1995/03/cameroon-sport-politics-
scoring-government-goals-with-football/. 
78 This account is based upon the following sources: Id.; Christopher Clarey, World Cup ’94; 
Cameroon Tries to Raise a Dream While All Else is Collapsing, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/15/sports/world-cup-94-cameroon-tries-to-raise-a-dream-
while-all-else-is-collapsing.html?pagewanted=all. 
79 Cameroon-Sport: Indomitable Lions Face World Cup Disqualification, IPS-INTER PRESS
SERV., May 7, 1994.  
80 FIFA drops threat against Cameroon, Xinhua News Agency, May 7, 1994. 
81 Id. 
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national team of Zimbabwe, a team that Cameroon had earlier 
eliminated, in upcoming World Cup play.82 
Rather than risk what the Inter Press Service described as “a 
potentially disastrous eventuality,” Prime Minister Achu and President 
Paul Biya backed down and acknowledged the election of Daher.83  
Moreover, before the FIFA intervention, Biya had apparently planned 
to turn Cameroonian soccer over to a newly created government body 
established by presidential decree the previous year, but Blatter’s 
warning seems to have led to Biya abandoning that plan.84  As it had 
done the year before with Greece, FIFA forced a change in a 
government plans by threatening to deny the country the opportunity 
to participate in international soccer.85 
Two additional cases in 1996 confirmed that FIFA had adopted a 
new policy in regard to internal intervention. In Algeria, the 
government took admittedly extreme steps to express its outrage at the 
recent failures of it national team.  After making the World Cup finals 
in 1982 and 1986, the Algerian national team stumbled during the next 
two World Cup cycles, and when it was eliminated from the 1998 
World Cup by Kenya in June of 1996, Algeria’s Minister of Youth and 
Sport, former national team player Mouldi Aisaoui, decided to revamp 
the country’s international program.86  Not only did he dissolve the 
Algerian Football Federation (FAF), he also suspended all of the FAF 
senior officials for five years.87 For good measure, he also fired Ali 
Fergani, the national team’s coach, and forbade him for working in 
Algerian soccer for the remainder of his life.88  Apparently Aisaoui 
intended for the Ministry of Sport to take over the role of the 
federation, a position that was unacceptable to FIFA, especially at a 
time when most of the government-run soccer federations in former 
82 See generally id. 
83 Etienne Tasse, Cameroon-Sport/Politics: Scoring Government Goals With Football, INTER
PRESS SERV. (Mar. 15, 1995), http://www.ipsnews.net/1995/03/cameroon-sport-politics-
scoring-government-goals-with-football/. 
84 See id. 
85 Id.  
86 For the elimination by Kenya, see Algeria national football team ‘A’ international record: 
1996, 11V11, http://www.11v11.com/teams/algeria/tab/matches/season/1996/ (last visited 
April 5, 2017). 
87 Algerian football body to be reinstated to beat FIFA sanctions, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR 
(Aug. 28, 1996). 
88 Id. 
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communist countries had been freed from state control.89  Rather that 
recognize the Ministry’s control of Algerian soccer, FIFA ordered 
Algeria to hold elections for a new FAF by the end of August or risk 
suspension.90 Although Algeria, unlike Greece and Cameroon, would 
not have lost a World Cup slot had it persisted in its resistance to FIFA, 
it also had no desire to be cast in the role of an international soccer 
“outlaw,” especially as it tried to rebuild its once vaunted national 
team.91 Consequently, the government abandoned its plans to take over 
Algerian soccer and instead scheduled new federation elections prior 
to the date ordered by FIFA.92 
Another opportunity for FIFA to threaten a national government 
came in late November 1996, when the Albanian Secretary of State for 
Education and Sport, Marjeta Pronjari-Zace, abruptly removed Eduard 
Dervishi, the secretary general of the Albanian Football Federation 
(AFF), from office, and dissolved the AFF’s executive committee.93  
Although the act may have been politically motivated - the Secretary 
and Dervishi were members of different political parties - Pronjari-
Zace claimed that her action was in response to Dervishi’s 
incompetence and his failure to hold a scheduled election for a new 
executive council.94 However, the delayed election cited by Pronjari-
Zace had already been the subject of negotiations between FIFA, the 
European Football Association (UEFA), the Albanian Football 
Association and the Albanian government, and an agreement to delay 
the election had been reached on October 29, reportedly with the 
consent of all, including Pronjari-Zace.95 
FIFA responded to Pronjari-Zace’s actions on November 27, 
1996, by banning Albania indefinitely from World Cup play, even 
though it was in the middle of the preliminary rounds for the 1998 
World Cup and was only a little more than two weeks away from a 
scheduled qualifying match with Northern Ireland.96  Asserting that it 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See generally id. 
92 Algerian football body to be reinstated to beat FIFA sanctions, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR 
(Aug. 28, 1996). 
93 Alex Standish, Albania hauled into line, THE EUROPEAN (Dec. 5, 1996). 
94 Id. 
95 FIFA Suspends Albania, ASSOCIATED PRESS INT’L (Nov. 27, 1996). 
96 FIFA Suspends Football Association of Albania, FIFA (Nov. 27 1996), 
http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=1996/m=11/news=fifa-suspends-football-
association-albania-70146.html. 
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“considered that these decisions violated FIFA’s statutory provisions 
as well as the agreement proposed by a FIFA/UEFA delegation and 
agreed upon by State Secretary for Sports, Marjeta [Pronjari-]Zace, in 
Tirana on October 29,” FIFA removed Albania from the FIFA 
Congress and imposed a December 7, 1996, deadline for the 
reappointment of Dervishi and the members of the executive council.97  
FIFA also noted that failure to meet the ten-day deadline could mean 
that Albania would be barred from participating in both the 1998 and 
2002 World Cup competitions, regardless of what steps it might 
subsequently take.98 
Even though Pronjari-Zace and her colleagues at the sports 
ministry appeared ready to resist the FIFA threats, other members of 
the Albanian government reacted differently.99  As had been the case 
with Greece, Cameroon, and Algeria, the prospect of a disappointed 
public led the Albanian government to accept the FIFA demands, and 
as early as November 29 (just two days after FIFA’s ultimatum), 
newspapers were reporting that Albania planned to do what was 
necessary to return to FIFA’s good graces.100  The following day, the 
Albanian Council of Ministers announced that the dismissals of 
Dervishi and the members of the executive council would be vacated, 
and all would immediately be returned to their old positions.101  In 
addition, Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi offered a number 
of public pronouncements affirming his country’s desire to play a role 
in international soccer and to comply with the FIFA statutes.102 On 
December 4, the Albanian Football Federation was officially reinstated 
as a member of FIFA, and on December 14, the national team played 
its scheduled game against Northern Ireland (which it lost, two to 
zero).103  FIFA officials were apparently so confident at this point that 
Albania would capitulate following its ultimatum that FIFA told the 
director of the Irish Football Association, the federation for Northern 
97 The quote from the FIFA communique is from Football, AGENCE FR. PRESSE – ENG. (Nov. 
27, 1996). 
98 Albania banned from international football competition, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR (Nov. 
27, 1996). 
99 FIFA ban a grave blow to Albanian football, official says, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR 
(Nov. 28, 1996). 
100 See Peter Byrne, Quinn’s recovery from knee surgery ahead of schedule, THE IRISH TIMES 
(Nov. 29, 1996). 
101 Albanian government withdraws sacking of football officials, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR 
(Nov. 30, 1996). 
102 Raymond Travers, Dowie puts Albanians in their place, SCOT. ON SUNDAY (Dec. 15, 1996). 
103 “Albania back in, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Dec. 4, 1996).  
6_FINAL_HYLTON (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2017  2:14 PM 
2017] FIFA USED PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY OF SPORT 151 
Ireland which was hosting the game, that it should not worry about 
having to cancel the game and should instead, “carry on as normal.”
104
The episodes involving Greece, Cameroon, Algeria, and Albania, 
all economically weak, vulnerable nations, established that FIFA 
leadership could “blackmail” certain countries when it believed that 
government action was contrary to its interests.  Beginning in 1997, 
the power was exercised with increased frequency, and by 2000, the 
number of cases in which FIFA had intervened on behalf of member 
associations facing some element of loss of control to government 
agencies had increased from four to thirteen, as additional actions were 
initiated  against Namibia, Poland, Zambia, Hungary, Cameroon 
(again), Benin, Guinea, Tanzania, and Brazil.105  In every case but one, 
Guinea, where the suspension lasted two year, the challenged 
government quickly complied with FIFA’s demands.106   
By 2000, the legitimacy of FIFA’s aggressive enforcement of the 
non-intervention policy also seemed to have been widely accepted by 
the sporting public.  In an August 2000 story reporting that the Sierra 
Leone legislature had called the Secretary General of the Sierra Leone 
Football Association to appear before it to explain the national team’s 
poor performance in recent games against Nigeria and Ghana, the 
Africa News observed, “[i]t is unusual for football association officials 
to face parliament because the World Governing Body, FIFA, is 
against political interference in soccer.”107 Although the practice of 
aggressively enforcing the non-intervention policy was less than a 
104 Alex Toner, It’s On!; Northern Ireland Given All Clear to Play Albania in Belfast, DAILY
MIRROR (Dec. 4, 1996).   
105 Conrad Argula, FIFA Threatens to Suspend Namibia, AFR. NEWS (June 26, 1998) 
(Namibia); Dominic O’Reilly, Power Struggle Brings World Ban, THE EUR. (Aug. 3, 1998) 
(Poland); Alfred Mulula Lusaka, Football Dispute May Lead to Suspension, IPS-INTER PRESS 
SERV. (Sept. 4, 1998) (Zambia); Greenland Presses for Recognition Around the World, THE
INDEP. (Sept. 28, 1999) (Hungary); Soccer Sunday, AFR. NEWS(Jan. 10, 1999) (Cameroon);  
Poland’s New Soccer President Calls for Reforms, ASSOC. PRESS INT’L, (June 29, 1999) 
(Poland); Norbert N. Ouendji, Joseph-Antoine Bell Denounces FIFA’s Interference, AFR.
NEWS (Oct. 29, 1999) (Cameroon); Cameroon Suspended Indefinitely by FIFA, AFR. NEWS 
(Dec. 25, 1999) (Cameroon); FIFA Ban on Benin Lifted, AGENCE FR. PRESSE – ENG. (Apr. 1, 
2000) (Benin); FIFA and Tanzania on Collision Course, AGENCE FR. PRESSE – ENG. 
(Tanzania); Fajah Barrie, Sierra Leone: Alimu Bah faces Parliament Monday, AFR. NEWS 
(Aug. 11, 2000) (Sierra Leone); Brazil Could Face World Cup Ban, THE SCOTSMAN (Oct. 30, 
2000) (Brazil); Brazil Faces World Cup Ban, SHANGHAI STAR (Oct. 31, 2000) (Brazil). 
106 See supra note 105. 
107 Fajah Barrie, Sierra Leone; Alimu Bah faces Parliament Monday, Afr. News (Aug. 11, 
2000). 
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decade old, it had clearly become part of the culture of international 
soccer and there is very little evidence of criticism of FIFA for taking 
this step.   
It was also clear by 2000 that the merits of the concerns that had 
prompted a government to intervene in soccer matters were irrelevant 
to FIFA. The official position was that governmental removal of a 
corrupt federation official outside of the rules of the federation was just 
as much a threat to the autonomy of soccer as the removal on purely 
political grounds of an official who had acted honestly and in the 
public interest. The same month that the above mentioned story 
appeared in the Africa News, Blatter warned the Brazilian legislature 
that if it continued with its announced investigation into corruption in 
soccer in Brazil, it risked the possibility of a suspension from 
international play, regardless of what the investigation revealed.108  As 
Slovenian sports law scholar Tine Misic later observed, in the years of 
Blatter’s involvement with FIFA the organization “developed a zero-
tolerance policy for any governmental interference regarding the 
affairs of its Members, thus arguably safeguarding their 
independence.”109  
Why Blatter’s assertion of private power at the expense of public 
interest did not produce greater criticism in the 1990’s and early 2000’s 
is a puzzling question.  Fortunately, for FIFA, the organization’s 
assertion of the non-intervention principle in the 1990’s came 
simultaneously with an important public debate concerning the proper 
role of sport within the governance structure of the European Union. 
The dominant view in that debate was that sport in a democratic society 
should be allowed to operate under private rather than governmental 
control.110 This view was embraced in a number of European Union 
documents adopted at the end of the twentieth century. For example, 
the Treaty of Amsterdam’s 1997 Declaration on Sport emphasized the 
social significance of sport but said little about the need for 
governmental regulation.111 Moreover, the Helsinki Report on Sport, 
108 Brazil Faces World Cup Ban, SHANGHAI STAR (Oct. 31, 2000). 
109 Tine Misic, Policing the (in)dependence of National Federations through the Prism of 
FIFA Statutes, ASSER INT’L SPORTS L. BLOG (July 10, 2015), 
http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/policing-the-in-dependence-of-national-
federations-through-the-prism-of-the-fifa-statutes-by-tine-misic. 
110 The collapse of the socialist model of sport in the decade was undoubtedly an important 
development influencing this line of thought. See, e.g., supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. 
111 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing 
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drafted for the European Commission in 1999, was prepared “with a 
view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the 
social function of sport within the Community framework.”112 The 
Helsinki Report on Sport  also emphasized the importance of the 
principle of subsidiarity (local control) and the autonomy of sporting 
organizations.113  Although the Nice Declaration of Sport (2000) 
recognized that the responsibility for administering sport was to be 
divided between sporting organizations and nation states, it also 
recognized that it was the task of the sports federations to organize, 
promote, and police their particular sports.114  Consequently, FIFA’s 
aggressive embrace of the non-intervention principle in the 1990’s 
probably seemed consonant with the general movement toward the 
embrace of the idea that autonomy of the private sports industry was 
generaly a good idea.115 
After 2000, FIFA became, if anything, even more openly 
committed to the non-interference principle.  A study of FIFA 
disciplinary actions between 2003 and 2013 by sports policy scholars 
Henk Erik Meier and Borja Garcia reports that in that eleven year 
period, FIFA issued twenty-four suspensions for improper 
governmental involvements, and in six other cases it would have 
suspended the national federation had the governments not quickly 
dropped their “objectionable” actions.116 Only one suspension, Brunei, 
lasted more than one year, and a substantial majority lasted less than 
two months, presumably because the “problem” was quickly 
corrected.117  Even where no formal action was taken, one could see 
the impact of FIFA’s policies.  In 2011, in spite of a warning from 
FIFA, Venezuela adopted a new Law of Sport sponsored by President 
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 29, Oct. 2, 1997, 11997D OJC 340. 
112 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL: THE HELSINKI REPORT ON
SPORT, COMM’N OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES (Oct. 12, 1999). 
113 Id.  at § 4.2. 
114 EUR. COUNCIL, CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENT: ANNEX IV – DECLARATION ON THE
SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SPORT AND ITS SOCIAL FUNCTION IN EUROPE, OF WHICH 
ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN IN IMPLEMENTING COMMON POLICIES (2000). 
115 Robert Siekman, The Specificity of Sport: Sporting Exceptions in EU Law, ASSER INT’L 
SPORTS L. CTR. (2012), 
http://www.pravst.unist.hr/dokumenti/zbornik/2012106/zb201204_697.pdf. For the larger 
question of whether the sports industry is entitled to a certain level of autonomy and freedom 
from government regulation. See, e.g., JEAN-LOUP CHAPPELET, AUTONOMY OF SPORT IN
EUROPE 11–12 (Council of Eur. Pub. 2010) (discussing the history of the embrace of autonomy 
principles by the International Olympic Committee). 
116 Meier & Garcia, supra note 65, at 895-97.   
117 Id. at 896–897. 
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Hugo Chavez that created a Sports Justice Commission with the 
statutory authority to hear complaints against the Venezuelan Football 
Federation (VFF) and other sporting organizations in ways that clearly 
would violate the FIFA Statutes.118  Although Venezuela refused to 
modify its statute in face of FIFA’s threats to suspend the VFF if the 
law passed, to date the law has not been invoked against the VFF, and 
there has been no evidence of state efforts to control the national 
federation.119   
Furthermore, beginning in 2000, FIFA adopted a policy of 
requiring federations in nations that had violated the non-intervention 
policy to accept FIFA-appointed “normalization committees” who 
would run the country’s soccer program until FIFA determined that it 
was “safe” for the national football association to retake control of the 
sport.120  In 2004, FIFA announced publically that it was stepping up 
“vigilance against government interference” and that its Associations 
Committee would devote special efforts to enforcing the anti-
intervention rules.121  In a September 27, 2004, media announcement, 
FIFA specifically named thirteen counties that gave the committee 
cause for concern.122  The next year, a FIFA task force was charged 
with investigating a number of contemporary problems, including the 
problem of government interference. 123  At the same time, FIFA also 
formally requested that countries with laws inconsistent with 
federation control of the sport of soccer - specifically Poland, Greece, 
118 Diego Ore, Soccer-Venezuela courts controversy with sports law, REUTERS (Aug 2, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/soccer-latam-venezuela-fifa-idUSLDE77200220110803. 
119 Pitching in, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21550302 
(discussing the impact of the new Sports Law, no mention is made of its application to 
soccer or the VFF).  
120 Salaam, FIFA suspends Tanzania, AGENCE FR. PRESSE (Oct. 27, 2000). The 
appointment of a normalisation committee is currently authorized for “exceptional 
circumstances.” FIFA, supra note 6, at art. 7.2. 
121 FIFA steps up vigilance against government interference, FIFA (Sep. 27, 2004), 
http://www.fifa.com/live-scores/news/y=2004/m=9/news=fifa-steps-vigilance-against-
government-interference-94282.html. 
122 Id. The thirteen country federations were, in the order of mention, Greece, Niger, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Guatemala, Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Barbuda, Burundi, Iraq, Kenya, and Puerto 
Rico. Id.  
123 See generally, FIFA Task Force to tackle current football problems, FIFA MEDIA 
RELEASE (Sep. 10, 2005), http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2005/m=9/news=fifa-
task-force-tackle-current-football-problems-100056.html.  The provisions authorizing the 
appointment of a normalization committee required consultation with the appropriate 
confederation and were inserted in the FIFA Statutes as Article 7.2.  The provision was 
retained in the 2016 revision of the statutes as Article 8.2. FIFA, supra note 6, at art. 8.2. 
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and Portugal - replace those laws by the middle of July 2006.124 In 
2008, another media release announced that the Associations 
Committee was continuing to actively monitor federation-government 
interactions.125  Also, as mentioned previously, the FIFA Statutes were 
rewritten at the end of the decade to more clearly state that 
independence from government influence was a mandatory 
requirement for FIFA members.126 
In 2014 and 2015, the final two years of Blatter’s tenure, FIFA 
suspended or threatened to suspend the soccer federations of Gambia 
(2014), Nigeria (2014), the Maldives (2014), Indonesia (2015), Kuwait 
(2015), Guatemala (2015), and Indonesia (2015).127 In three of these 
cases (Gambia, Maldives, and Guatemala) the investigated country 
was required to accept a normalisation committee, and in Guatemala 
the term of its normalisation committee was extended into a second 
year.128  All of the listed federations were suspended or threatened with 
suspension exclusively because of governmental interference, except 
124 FIFA Task Force to tackle current football problems, supra note 123. 
125 See generally, Strong deference of the independence of football associations, FIFA MEDIA 
RELEASE (Feb. 06, 2008), http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2008/m=2/news=strong-
defence-the-independence-football-associations-685487.html. 
126 It was at this time that Articles 13, 14, and 17, were enacted in their expanded form.  See 
FIFA, supra note 23.  
127 Normalisation Committee appointed for Gambia Football Federation, FIFA.COM (July 10, 
2014), http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2014/m=7/news=normalisation-committee-
appointed-for-gambia-football-federation-2403244.html; FIFA Emergency Committee sets 8 
September deadline for NFF, FIFA.COM (Sept. 03, 2014), 
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2014/m=9/news=fifa-emergency-committee-sets-
8-september-deadline-for-nff-2435742.html; Suspension of the Kuwait Football Association, 
FIFA.COM (Oct. 16, 2015),
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2015/m=10/news=suspension-of-the-kuwait-
football-association-2717726.html; Suspension of the Guatemala Football Association, FIFA 
MEDIA RELEASE (Oct. 28, 2016),
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2016/m=10/news=suspension-of-the-guatemala-
football-association-2847078.html; Normalisation committee appointed for the Football 
Association of Maldives, FIFA.COM (Dec. 02, 2014), 
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2014/m=12/news=normalisation-committee-
appointed-for-the-football-association-of-mald-2486998.html; Indonesia disqualified from 
2018 FIFA World Cup Russia and AFC Asian Cup 2019 qualifies, FIFA.COM (June 03, 2015), 
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2015/m=6/news=indonesia-disqualified-from-2018-
fifa-world-cup-russia-and-afc-asian-c-2617809.html; Fifa ends Indonesia’s suspension from 
football after almost a year, BBC (May 14, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/36292992; FIFA Fails to Lift Kuwait Suspension – 
Al-Maayouf Faults Personal Agendas, ARAB TIMES (May 14, 2016), 
http://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/fifa-fails-lift-kuwait-suspension-al-maayouf-faults-
politics-personal-agendas/. 
128 See supra note 127. 
6_FINAL_HYLTON (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2017  2:14 PM 
156 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32:134 
for Gambia, which was also accused of using overage players in 
international youth competitions.129   
In every case, but that of Kuwait and Guatemala, the national 
government accused of third-party interference acknowledged the 
legitimacy of new Articles 13 and 17 and terminated the complained 
of intervention.130  In most cases, the capitulation was quite quick.  
Guatemala also initially capitulated, accepting a normalisation 
committee in December 2015.131  However, when FIFA decided to 
extend the committee for another ten months in September 2016, 
because of the alleged failure to cooperate on the part of Guatemalan 
officials, Guatemala balked, and FIFA formally suspended the 
Guatemalan Football Federation.132  Additionally, when the Kuwaiti 
government refused to cooperate with FIFA the Kuwaiti Football 
Association was indefinitely suspended.133 
Throughout Blatter’s tenure, federations subject to FIFA-imposed 
sanctions had the right under the FIFA Statutes to challenge these 
penalties in the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, 
Switzerland.134  However, FIFA’s tactics were so effective that no 
federation did so until 2014, when an ousted president of the Nigerian 
Football Federation (NFF) challenged the legality of FIFA’s 
conduct.135  At the beginning of July, 2014, shortly after the 
elimination of Nigeria by France in that year’s World Cup, the 
leadership of the NFF was enjoined by a Nigerian court from 
continuing to operate the federation.136  In addition, a government 
representative was appointed to manage the federation’s affairs until 
the court had time to rule on the legality of past actions by the previous 
129 Normalisation Committee appointed for Gambia Football Federation, supra note 127. 
130 See supra note 127. 




133 Football Shorts, SUN. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016). According to the Times, FIFA also 
contemplated filing a lawsuit against Kuwait, although where and what grounds was 
not revealed. Id. As of March 1, 2017, Guatemala and Kuwait remain on the FIFA suspended 
list. 
134 FIFA, FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE (2017). 
135 Samm Audu, CAS Reject Giwa Group Appeal to Restrain FIFA, AFRICAN FOOTBALL (Sept. 
10, 2014), http://africanfootball.com/news/457517/CAS-reject-Giwa-group-appeal-to-
restrain-FIFA. 
136 Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3744. 
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NFF leadership.137 Citing improper governmental intervention, FIFA 
suspended the NFF on July 9, and, true to form, the Nigerian 
government capitulated and restored to office the old leadership on 
July 16.138  Then, on August 26, 2014, an election for president of the 
NFF was won by a professional soccer club owner named Chris 
Giwa.139  Believing Giwa’s election to be the result of continuing 
improper influence on the part of the Nigerian government FIFA again 
threatened to suspend the NFF from international play, unless another 
election was held.140  The NFF again capitulated, and another election 
was held the following month, this time resulting in the election of a 
candidate acceptable to FIFA.141   
At this point, Giwa filed a suit against FIFA in the CAS, claiming 
to be the actual president of the NFF.142  On May 15, 2015, in the case 
of Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA,143 a three-man, all European 
arbitral panel accepted the legitimacy of the FIFA non-intervention 
rules and the way in which they were used to limit governmental 
involvement with soccer federations.  Although the panel emphasized 
the very narrow scope of its ruling, holding only that FIFA had 
correctly applied its own rule in refusing to accept Giwa’s election in 
2014, the fact was that FIFA had again prevailed.144 If there had been 
any concern that the CAS panel might pry into the ways in which FIFA 
applied the non-intervention principle, those concerns proved 
unfounded.  Ironically, this “vindication” of Blatter’s policies by the 
CAS arbitrators came just twelve days before seven FIFA officials 
were arrested on corruption charges in Zurich, Switzerland.145 The 
Zurich arrests set in motion a set of events that quickly culminated in 
Blatter’s suspension from the FIFA presidency on October 8, 2015, 
 
137 Id at 3. 
138 Id at 4. 
139 Id at 7–8.  
140 Id at 20. 
141 Id. 
142 FIFA Emergency Committee suspends Nigeria Football Federation, FIFA.COM (July 9, 
2014), http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2014/m=7/news=keep-pending-fifa-
emergency-committee-suspends-nigeria-football-federa-2402265.html; Nigeria’s Ban from 
FIFA Lifted after the Reinstatement of Officials, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/jul/18/nigeria-reinstated-fifa-ban.  
143 Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3744.   
144 Id. 
145 FIFA Officials Arrested on Corruption Charges as World Cup Inquiry Launched, 
GUARDIAN (May 27, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/may/27/several-top-
fifa-officials-arrested. 
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less than five months after the CAS decision.146   
CONCLUSION 
Whether or not the departure of Blatter and several of his 
colleagues from the upper ranks of the FIFA leadership marks an end 
to the era of FIFA interventions into national federation affairs remains 
to be seen.147  In all likelihood, it will continue in some form, as not 
every application of the non-intervention principle by FIFA since the 
early 1990’s was simply a matter of Blatter and his allies trying to 
protect a crony from prosecution or removal from office.  Future 
investigations will identify which of the more than fifty interventions 
during Blatter’s presidency were based on legitimate concerns.  No 
doubt, there may be some circumstances in which governmental 
intervention into the internal affairs of a national soccer federation may 
be unjustified.  In fact, governmental conduct that is completely 
arbitrary or corrupt should be resisted by private sports organizations.  
However, if the non-intervention principle is retained, it should be held 
in reserve for such cases, where, to use the language of new Article 19, 
the intervention is “undue” or completely unreasonable.148   
During the Havelange-Blatter era, FIFA officials clearly used the 
non-intervention principle to provide a prophylactic shield around its 
internal affairs. One can hope that in the future the new FIFA 
leadership will be less trigger-happy in imposing suspensions and 
normalization committees, especially in cases were the goal of 
 
146 Sam Borden, FIFA President Sepp Blatter and Other Top Officials Suspended, Deepening 
FIFA’s Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/sports/soccer/sepp-blatter-michel-platini-jerome-
valcke-fifa-suspended.html?_r=0. 
147 There are already some indications that it may not.  After Blatter’s resignation, the 
suspension of Indonesia, which involved the institution of a financial solvency based-licensing 
requirement for professional teams, was not revoked until Indonesia abandoned the 
requirement in May 2016. FIFA Ends Indonesia's Suspension from Football after Almost a 
Year, BBC SPORT FOOTBALL (May 14, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/36292992. 
Moreover, in the spring of 2016, FIFA forced Greece to reinstate the Greek Cup (which had 
been suspended by the Greek government over issues of match fixing and fan violence) and 
to accept a normalization committee to avoid suspension from FIFA. See Graham Wood, 
Greece given 10 Days to Reverse Cup Cancellation or Face FIFA Suspension, REUTERS 
SPORTS NEWS (Apr. 5, 2016), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-greece-
idUKKCN0X221L; Agreement between Greece, FIFA to Avoid Suspension of Greek Clubs, 
AGENCIA EFE (May 12, 2016), http://www.efe.com/efe/english/sports/agreement-between-
greece-fifa-to-avoid-suspension-of-greek-clubs/50000266-2894504;  
148 FIFA, supra note 6 art. 19.  
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government involvement is simply to remove corrupt officials or to 
improve public enjoyment of sport. 
